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Men and Things: The Liberal Bias Against Property
by Thomas L. Shaffer
Ownership of property is as
prevalent in human society as taxes
and government, and almost as
prevalent as sex. Most men are
more concerned with their
possessions and with what it takes
to acquire and protect them than
they are with righteous indignation.
W HEN A PROPERTY teacher sets
out to learn about the human
facts in his subject-if, for instance, he
wants to learn about the behavioral as-
pects of the law of the dead (wills,
trusts, future interests and death taxa-
tion)-he will be discouraged by the
fact that psychological literature has a
great deal to say about sex, and even
quite a bit about death, but almost
nothing about property.
There are a couple of metaphysical
essays by Jean-Paul Sartre, 1 and, from
the founders of psychoanalysis, the
theory that our concern about property
begins at the potty chair. 2 But for the
most part the men who have been most
interested in studying the human spirit
have not been concerned about our re-
lationships with things. There may be
a reason for that. And the reason may
be useful for our profession, which
necessarily deals with property and
which should begin to learn what it
cannot learn from behavioral science.
Most Revolutionaries Are
Naive About Property
Here is a guess: The most revolu-
tionary elements in our society are na-
Yve about property. They say, as Wil-
liam Stringfellow, a distinguished law-
yer, said in his book Dissenter in a
Great Society:
The venerable ideological conflict in
our society between those who regard
property, and the ownership of prop-
erty, as the moral basis for society and
those persuaded that human rights
must have precedence in the ordering
of society and the making of public
policy once more dominates the Amer-
ican scene.3
Some of our revolutionaries (not in-
cluding Mr. Stringfellow) say that
banks must burn and some that houses
should be owned communally. The as-
piration is that we share our burdens
and our benefits and forget about own.
ership. In some hard-to-get-at %vay this
sentiment is implicit in the communal
spirit-the let's-get-together ethic-of
the coming generation. And something
like this same spirit is implicit in the
ideas and sympathies of those of us
who often cheer at the irreverence of
the corning generation. This is a mildly
utopian idea; it is prevalent in the lit-
erature of the new left and the not-so-
new, not-so-left, and it suggests a lib-
eral bias against property. (If the
word "liberal" seems bothersome, sub-
stitute "reformer's" or even "revolu-
tionary's". "Liberal" is used here,
frankly, to provoke annoy ance.) There
is at least the implied aspiration that it
is possible to separate the ownership of
property from tie rights of men. What-
ever it is, it seems to be erroneous, and
the error could make a difference.
More to the present point is that it
seems to be part of the current liberal.
ism in behavioral science. 4
My favorite image on men and
things is Humphrey Bogart on the Al-
rican Queen, chugging down that fetid
jungle river with Katherine Hepburn.
The boat's ancient steam engine
jammed and rattled and scattered hot
steam, and Bogart jumped up, ran to
the boiler and kicked it. And the boiler
worked again.
Hepburn asked what was the matter
with the boiler, and Bogart said it was
jammed. Hepburn asked hbin why, and
Bogart said, "I left a screwdriver in it
one day when I was working on it, and
the screw driver jams a valve." Ilep-
1. SARTRE, EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS
(1953).
2. FERE1CZI1, SEX IN PsYCiio-ANALYSIS(1958).
3. STRINGFELLow, DISSENTER IN A G8EAT
SOCIETY (1964); see Slater, Cultures in Col
lision, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 31 (July 1970).
4. See Moynihan, Elitelaud, PsYcaOLOGY
TODAY 35 (September, 1970).
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burn asked why he didn't take it apart
and take the screwdriver out. And Bo-
gart said, "I could do that, Miss, but I
like to kick her. She's all I got."
You cannot talk about the captain of
the African Queen as a person unless
you are willing to talk about the A/ri-
can Queen as an extension of its cap-
tain-as pa.rt of his personality. That
seems obvious, but it is an instinctive
judgment on which the behavioral
scientists have presented no data. They
have defaulted on their clear duty to
satisfy the curiosity of lawyers. If they
had not failed us-or if they someday
propose to redeem their failure-what
might be the behavioral theories on
man's ownership of things? Here are
three ideas.5
"I Am What
I Have"
First, property is something I am. It
is a part of what is nie. Sartre makes a
theoretical case for that proposition:
The quality of being possessed does
not indicate -a purely external denomi-
nation . . .; on the contrary, this qual-
ity affects its very depths. . . .This is
the significance of primitive funeral
ceremonies where the dead are buried
with the objects which belong to them.
...The corpse, the cup from which
the dead man drank, the knife he used
make a single dead person. The desire
to have is at bottom reducible to the
desire to be related to a certain object
in a certain relation of being.
I draw the collection of my sur-
roundings into being with myself. If
they are taken from me, they die as
my arm would die if it were severed
from me.
The totality of my possessions re-
flects the totality of my being. I am
what I have.6
Property personality is a common
thing in the law of succession in this
culture and others. Consider the as-
tounding respect that is shown for the
wishes of a dead man on the disposi-
tion of his property. In Tahiti,7 and in
Iowa and Kansas for that matter, one
reason t man makes a will is in order
to prevent fights-because his survi-
vors will not resist what he wants done
as much as they will resist someone
else, someone who lacks the dead
man's identification with the property.
Throughout the law of succession, in
all cultures, there lingers the idea that
the property is the personality of the
dead nuan. Property is his imnortali-
ty.5
Try that thought on yourself. Pre-
tend you are going on a long trip, a
trip from which you may never return.
What will you take with you? What is
the most valuable thing you own? And
what is the most significant thing to
you personally? Can you tell clearly
where you end and the things on your
take-along list begin? 9 Those who
study the dynamics of "total institu-
tions"-prisons and asylums-report
one of the principal ways to make in-
mates docile is to take away everything
they own.t5 The result is not only a
naked man, but also a naked personal-
ity. Justice Holmes said: "A thing
which you have enjoyed and used as
your own for a long time, whether
property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away
without your resenting the act and
trying to defend yourself, however you
came by it."11
Property Is
Something I Do
Property is more than something I
am. It is also something I do. One of
the first signs of a beginning of owner-
ship among primitive, communistic so-
cieties is respect for primary rights in
things that are the fruit of labor.
Among the Yamana of South America,
for instance, if I catch a whale, the
blubber belongs to everyone in the vil-
lage. But I get first pick and, to some
extent, get to choose who gets second
5. See also SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY
AND LAWYERS (1971) ; Shaffer, The Psychol-
ogy of Testation, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 11
(1969); Shaffer, Will Interviews, Young
Family Clients, and the Psychology of Testa-
lion, 44 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 345 (1969) ; and
Shaffer, The Psychological Autopsy in Judi-
cial Opinions under Section 2035, 3 LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY OF Los ANGELES L. REV. 1
(1970).
6. SARTRE, supra note 1, at 122-123.
7. Cairns, The Explanatory Process in the
Field of Inheritance, 20 IowA L. REV. 266,
281 (1935).
8. See generally GODY, DEATH, PROPERTY,
AND THE ANCESTORS (1962).
9. Thanks to Dr. Oron South, of the Mid-
west Group for Human Resources, for this
and third pick.' 2 In the Semang society
on the Malay Peninsula, there is no
ownership of land or buildings, but
every warrior owns his own poison
tree. 13 The Eskimos of Greenland and
the Arctic Siberians recognize almost
no exclusive ownership, but if you
want to learn a spell or a hunting song
you have to pay the man who knows
it. 14
In each of these instances-and in
the case of American businessmen-
property is what I do. And this is true
beyond consideration of wealth. I
asked a veteran life insurance under-
writer a couple of years ago about his
business clients. He said they were al-
ways greatly concerned about what
would happen to their businesses when
they died. I asked him if they knew
how much their businesses were worth,
and he said they usually did not.
Property Is
Something I Use
Property is more than what I am
and more than what I do. It is also
something I use, and there are three
radically different aspects of property
as use.
Property may be a conduit to other
people; it may be a cornerstone of
human relationships. Freud noticed this
in his Psychopathology of Everyday
Life.15 I am enjoying myself at your
house but have to leave, and when I
leave I forget ily coat. I have to go to
the office on a Sunday afternoon and
resent it, and find when I get there that
I left my keys at home. My things-
coat and keys-are where I wish I
were. A patient of Freud's was having
trouble with his wife; she gave him a
suggestion.
10. GoFEMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) ; SYKES,
THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958).
11. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAn.
L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
12. Lowie, Incorporeal Property in Primi-
tive Society, 37 YALE L. J. 551, 552-553
(1928).
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 553-555; The return of succes-
sion and even testation to Soviet law is an
interesting parallel. See Griffin, The About
Turn: Soviet Law of Inheritance, 10 AM. J.
CoMe. L. 431 (1961).
15. FREUD, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EV-
ERYDAY LIFE (Mentor ed., 1951); ch. II,
JONES, PAPERS ON Psyco-ANALYSIS (Beacon
ed. 1961).
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book and he misplaced it. Six months
later their relationship improved, and
the patient found the book in some ob-
vious place in his desk.
It has usually been thought that pri-
mogeniture, the legal system under
which property is inherited by an eld-
est son to the exclusion of everyone
else, is medieval and undemocratic.
But societies that have observed pri-
mogeniture-including fairly modern
societies-are often prosperous. This
comes about because the central family
-father or eldest son-takes care of
everyone else. Property is used to keep
the family together at least as much as
the family is used to keep the property
together.i6
The line between rights in things
and rights in persons is functionally
obscure. Most legal systems have a]-
ways recognized riglhts in persons as a
species of property. The levirate-a
customn under which a widow is given
to her husband's brother-seems a
cruel instance of that, but it is not
really so different from child owner-
ship, or even wife ownership, in our
own society.17 Engels saw this connec-
tion; he wrote that the institution of
marriage had to decline with decline in
the institution of property. The two go
together-a dogma that caused great
theoretical turmoil in the Soviet Union
until Stalin rejected it)
Property is something I use, in a
second sense, as a significant personal
expression not otherwise available to
me. There is a custom among one tribe
of Indians in Arizona, for example,
that everything a dead man owns is de-
stroyed when he dies. Survivors are
afraid of the dead; they want solid
earth between them and all extensions
of the dead man-including his prop-
erty personality. 19 We all know carpen-
ters who could not be who they are
without wood and tools. The only own-
ership recognized in many primitive
societies is the ownership of things to
work with. A quaint example of that is
the IHopi garden. A husband may own
the garden, and he may do whatever he
wishes with his produce as long as he
is in the garden. But if he brings the
produce into the house-his wife's
house, as the Hopi see it-the produce
doesn't belong to him anymore and
only his wife is allow~ed to give it
away.
20
The idea of ownership begins when
self-expression with property requires
exclusive rights in it. It may be that
the need for exclusive control has im-
portant psychological significance. The
anthropologist Rene Millon hit upon
the very rude beginnings of land own-
ership among the Sierra Populaca of
Mexico. Those people were just begin-
ning to permit a man to demand exclu-
sive rights in his grove of coffee trees
-the land as well as the trees. They
had recognized for a long time that a
man could own the trees, but only re-
cently did they expand this idea to the
land itself. And the apparent explana-
tion of the extension is that they had
discovered that they could grow more
and better coffee that way. Millon does
not guess at the effects of this transi-
tion on the social and psychic person-
ality of the coffee grower.21
There is a third sense in which prop-
erty is something I use, and that is as a
means of assuming and protecting
power. The coffee trees of the Sierra
Populaca suggest that development.
There are many instances in our own
history. An example is the use of land
grants in the United States and in
Spanish America, not only as a means
of economic development, but as a
means of solidifying power. For an-
other example, the English feudal sys.
tem, from which our law of property
grew, was above all a system of gov-
ernment.
2 2
Transmissions of Status and
Property Are Inseparable
The transmission of status-which is
a symbol of power-and the transmis-
sion of property are functionally inse-
parable. Titles and positions of honor
illustrate that throughout Western his-
tory; and there is more transmission
of status in our own culture than we
may be ready to admit. You can reflect
on that fact as you run down the roster
of names in the United States Senate.
In societies entirely alien to our own,
the transmission of corporate member-
ship-in clan groups, in castes, in the
primitive equivalent of the country
Thomas L. Shaffer, who is associ-
ate dean and professor of law at
Notre Dame Law School, is on leave
this academic year as a visiting pro-
fessor of law at the University of Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles. He was educat-
ed at the University of Albuquerque
(BA.) 1958) and Notre Dame (JD.
1961).
club-is property used to assume and
protect power.
I think Mr. Stringfellow and reform-
ers of his persuasion, as well as revolu-
tionaries who will doubtlessly be in-
fluenced by him, make a mistake when
they equate the assumption and protec.
tion of power with property ownership.
And the mistake may lead them far be-
yond anything they had in mind. There
is a kind of revolution that is callow
and therefore unwittingly inhumane.
Successful revolutions-and the most
successful of all revolutions, the Amer-
ican Revolution, was designed and im-
plemented by lawyers-are built on a
healthy respect for the way people are.
16. Cairns, supra note 7 at 268-281: Rad-
cliffe-Brown, Patrilineal and Matrilineal Sue-
cession. 20 IOWA L. Rev. 286, 297-303
(1935); Griffin supra note 14.
17. Ibid. (Radcliffe-Brown).
18. Atkinson, Succession. Among Collater-
als, 20 IowA L. REv. 185, 186, note 3 (1935).
19. Blauner, Death and Social Structure,
29 PSVCI"ATRY 378 (1966).
20. Beaglehole, Ownership and Inheritance
in an American Indian Tribe, 20 IOWA L.
REv. 304 (1935).
21. Millon, Trade, Tree Cultivation, and
the Developrnent of Private Property in Land,
57 AtERIetCAx AT'resRoPoLoGIsi 698 (1955).
22. See generally Cairns, supra note 7;
JOHN, LAND TENURE rN EARLY ENGLAND
(1960).
February, 1971 * Volume 57 125
Men and Things
Callow revolutions tend to unexpected
catastrophe. I agree with Justice
Holmes that "the notion that with so-
cialized property we should have
women free and a piano for everybody
seems to me an empty humbug".23 One
thing every reformer ought to try for
on pain of failure-is an apprecia-
tion for what is most important to the
people he proposes to reform.
In terms of national policy, an
appreciation for the way people are
and the way people own will tend to
support, for example, the way our fed-
eral tax structure has grown up, so that
businessmen are taxed just this side of
destroying their desire to own more
than they have. And death taxes are
kept just low enough so that a man
does not lose all hope of aggregating
status and power and passing it along
to his children.
A primary goal of the American wel-
fare state supported, as it is, by tax-
ing policies that take realistic account
of the way people are is that every
household should have a house. Every
person should have enough property to
guarantee and safeguard personality;
for dignified labor; for sound relation-
ships with those he loves; and for self-
expression.
Behavioral scientists don't probe
property relationships in our culture
because they are mcmbers, by and
large, of Mr. Stringfellow's species of
reformer. The trite label for that spe-
cies is middle-class liberal. Middle-
class liberals are ambivalent about
property. They are comfortable with
their things. They couldn't get along
without things. But social passions and
consider-the-lilies-of-the-field idealism
leave one somehow ashamed of owner-
ship and, especially, of the love of
ownership.
Hypocrisy of Property
Is a Sore Spot
The enlightened American liberal
has come to terms with his sex im-
pulses and even has learned to live
with anxiety about death both more
advertently, and more efficiently, than
he has dealt with his ambivalence
about the comforts of property. The re-
bellious kids have some pretty useless
ideas about distribution of property,
but they hit a sore spot when they talk
to their elders about the hypocrisy of
property.
Middle-class liberals aside, most men
are more concerned with their things
and with what it takes to acquire and
protect their things than they arc with
righteous indignation. The comparison
is important because self-expression
the "firstuess of the First" (Amend-
ment) appears to be a sort of pri-
mary, non-negotiable value among the
vocal leaders of the coming generation,
and even more so among the admirers
and supporters they have in the com-
mand generation. But most people set
almost as much store by the nonvocal
dimensions of their personalities.
All of us are more involved in our
things than many of us care to admit.
Anyone who proposes to be a revolu-
tionary should realize that, as Judge
Prettyman said, "The right of a man
. . . to warm his slippered feet before
his own open fireplace is as great as
his right to gather with his neighbors
in the corner pub and cuss the govern-
ment." 24
23. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 306
(1921).
24. PtETirYMAN, TRIAL By AGENCY 15
(1959).
Calendar of Association Meetings
Annual
New York, New York
and London, England
San Francisco, California
Washington, D.C.
Honolulu, Hawaii
Montreal, Canada
Atlanta, Georgia
Chicago, Illinois
New York, New York
Chicago, Illinois
New Orleans, Louisiana
Cleveland, Ohio
Houston, Texas
Midyear
July 5-7,
July 14-20,
August 14-17,
August 6-9,
August 12-16,
August 11-15,
August 7-12,
August 6-11,
August 5-10,
February 4-9,
February 3-8,
February 7-13,
February 1-5,
Spring, 1971
Williamsburg, Virginia April 26-30, 1971(Administration Committee, April 27 and 28; Budget Committee,
April 26, 27 and 28; Board of Governors, April 29 and 30.)
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